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Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians has 51 ratings and 0 reviews. Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers of. Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians by Ibn Taymiyyah, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide. Ibn Taymiyya, Against the Greek Logicians Introduction and translation by Wael B . Hallaq Oxford: Clarendon Press, Iviii + p. Show all authors.

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On this view, then, logic stood not merely as a set of tautologies, but equally served as an epistemic system, a theory of knowledge proper. The hearer may or may not know the truthfulness of this proposition before hearing it. Youth, for instance, is a separable attribute that detaches itself from man at a pace slower than does the position of sitting down or standing up.

It is interesting to note that the argument contained in obn paragraph has been reproduced without being abridged, and Ibn Taymiyya says nothing elsewhere to shed further light on it. This entry has no external links.

Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians – Wael B. Hallaq – Oxford University Press

againsy On the role of matter in the argument for the eternity of the World, see Davidson, Proofs,and the sources cited therein. Now, if induction is incomplete, the so-called universal premiss may prove false since it might be refuted by new evidence.

Space, Time, and Stuff Frank Arntzenius. The second principle, which has no truth in it, is the distinction between what is a necessary concomitant to quiddity and what is essential to it.

He therefore set out to refute philosophical logic, a task which culminated in one of the most devastating attacks ever levelled against the logical system upheld by the early Greeks, the later commentators, and their Muslim followers.

The latter was published in in two volumes, of which 1 was able to obtain only the first. Unlike Ghazali, who rejected philosophical metaphysics but embraced logic, Ibn Taymiyya considered the two inextricably connected. Seventh, he who hears a definition would not apprehend it if he had not already understood the words of the definition and their individual signification.


Logic, he asserted, must follow the natural movement of thought. In fact, he goes further and argues that not only may an analogy be converted into a syllogism in the first figure and vice versa, but an analogical or syllogistic inference can also be recast in the form of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

Wael B. Hallaq (ed.), Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians – PhilPapers

If our understanding of Ibn Taymiyya is correct, then the consequence of his view would pose the problem that the acquisition of knowledge is severely restricted, that arriving at new knowledge is practically impossible. Ibn Taymiyya, one grewk the greatest and most prolific thinkers in medieval Islam, held Gree He was never distracted by the multiplicity and variety of uses to which logic was put in Islamic religious discourse.

HN rated it it was amazing Jul 29, What is self-evident for someone may, without the need for definition, againstt become axiomatic for another through means similar to those to which the former was exposed.

This conception would certainly seem harmonious with Ibn Arabi’s creed that things in the world cannot be changed, not even by God Himself. Thus it is argued that, although the rays of the sun are not the sun itself, they are not other than the sun. And this is what we sought to prove. At other times, he integrates into one lengthy argument a variety of sub-arguments that are of a different type altogether.

Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians

He therefore set out to refute philosophical logic, a task greekk culminated in one of the most devastating attacks ever levelled against the logical system upheld by the early Greeks, the later commentators, and their Muslim followers.

Examples are ‘figure’ for ‘triangle,’ or ‘corporeality’ for ‘human b e i n g. In any case, the evidence available points in the direction of Nawbakhtl’s work as the earliest criticism known to Ibn Taymiyya. In this case, it is clear that it was not the definition grdek led to forming the concept.


A person who has rounded knowledge of both the logifians and the circumstances under which they have narrated a particular prophetic tradition will be in a better position to believe or disbelieve the veracity of such tradition than another who lacks such circumstantial and contextual knowledge.

Knowledge, whose acquisition is the main task of logic, obtains in the mind either 1 in the form of individual concepts which connote the essential attribute of a thing, such as the concepts of ‘body’ and ‘soul’, or 2 in the form of judgements, such as ‘the world vreek created’.

The rest of the paragraph, however, seems to provide an attempt to answer this problem. Ibn Taymiyya’s Refutation xvii although they are neither constitutive nor a part of quiddity.

Again, the case of wine affords a basic example. Ninth, one may form concepts of existing things either through one’s external senses—such as taste, colour, odour, and bodies which possess such attributes—or through one’s inner senses, such as hunger, love, hate, happiness, sadness, pleasure, pain, volition, repugnance, and the like. But if without a definition the hearer does form a concept of the definiendum, whether before, simultaneously with, or subsequent to hearing the report, and if he comes to know that this is its definition, only then will he know the truthfulness of that definition.

Complete or real definition, the highest objective of the definer, requires a statement of the definiendum’s quiddity, represented in the essential attributes constituting the genus and the difference to the exclusion of the property and the general accident.

When I was in Alexandria, I met one of those who glorify the philosophers 2 by exaggerating their importance and by imitating them, so I mentioned to him some of what they deserve by way of exposing their ignorance and errors.